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Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

2107 Department of Justice, Washington 25, D. C.

October 12, 1951

***DOJ Declassification/Release
Decision on File***

Wed 11.11

MEMORANDUM FOR: ICIS Subcommittee on Protection of
Classified Government Data

✓ Captain J. A. Waters
AEC Ad Hoc Representative

Mr. William W. Harrison
Treasury Department Ad Hoc Representative

Col. Sheffield Edwards
CIA Ad Hoc Representative

SUBJECT: ICIS Suggestions Regarding Implementation of
President's Directive Regarding Executive Order 10290.

In accordance with the agreement reached at the subcommittee's meeting on October 11, 1951, enclosed is a copy of the ICIS suggestions on this subject, dated October 10, 1951, for the use of the regular and ad hoc members prior to the next meeting to be held on October 17, 1951, at 2:00 p.m., in Room 5218, Department of Justice.

Leonard P. Bienvenu
by hkm

Leonard P. Bienvenu
Secretary, ICIS

cc: Mr. Fred E. Strine.
Mr. T. Oscar Smith.
Mr. Kurt E. Rosinger.
Mr. Donald L. Nicholson.
Col. Sidney S. Rubenstein.
Mr. James L. Grahl.

*Ref State } Proposed
Comm } for Sec.
Justice } Ad. Comm.*

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Steps which the ICIS might take to implement the President's directive in regard to Executive Order 10290, as suggested by the ICIS members at the meeting on October 9, 1951:

1. ICIS might request the agencies to submit any regulations they are drawing up under this Executive Order, in order that ICIS might approve such regulations. Should agencies indicate that they have no regulations or are not in the process of writing regulations, these agencies might be required to develop appropriate regulations.
2. A questionnaire should be prepared and sent to all agencies. The questionnaire should cover each paragraph of the regulations and should contain pertinent inquiries, so that answers thereto would indicate whether the Executive Order is being properly implemented. The questionnaire should be drafted in such a manner as to force the establishment of implementing machinery.
3. Within the agency it might be advisable to provide immediate guidance through the use of specific examples illustrating the nature of items of information which should be classified.
4. Actual physical inspections could not possibly be undertaken by the ICIS; however, it may be advisable for the agency itself to undertake an actual physical inspection of its procedures and machinery.
5. Within an organizational unit of an agency, an assigned classification to a particular document might be reviewed by a designated officer prior to the release of the classified paper from the unit, in order that there may be some assurance of the need for classification. Should there be disagreement between the reviewing officer and the person assigning the classification, the matter could be discussed with the unit chief.
6. Declassification staffs might be established.
7. Steps might be taken to insure that qualified, experienced persons are placed in charge of the administration of the Executive Order.
8. Over-all agency boards might be established, or an agency reviewing official might be designated to handle appeals concerning classification of any documents, including appeals from the press.

9. Since the Executive Order becomes effective on October 26, it was suggested that the ICIS "policing" system be ready to operate. However, it was pointed out that this may not be possible and, in lieu thereof, certain stop-gap measures should be ready for implementation. Or, there should be ready an outline of all steps the ICIS will take under this program.
10. An announcement might be made that the ICIS is working on this matter and that its Subcommittee, augmented by the more sensitive agencies, is working out a detailed procedure to carry out its responsibilities, and that every angle will be considered and studied.
11. As a stop-gap measure the ICIS might transmit to all agencies the definitions for the various categories of classified information which was contained in its proposed executive order, as submitted to the NSC, and which were later deleted. This would be aimed at remedying the defect noted by the press as to lack of specific definitions.
12. Public releases should be cleared with the originating office rather than the security officer, such as is done in the Department of State.
13. "Top secret" control officers should be designated, in order to insure a very minimum use of this classification.
14. Security review officers might be designated as is done in the Department of Defense.
15. The ICIS might designate someone to spend an hour or so in each of the different departments and agencies, educating and indoctrinating appropriate officials concerning the Executive Order.
16. The Subcommittee should examine all the various suggestions made by the press.

The Subcommittee should, on the basis of its expert experience and knowledge, develop further proposals not listed herein.